Hindu-Muslim Divide: British Invention or British Complicity?
The Arab Spring was successful for Islam. It succeeded at reviving religious zeal amongst Muslims, many of whom saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity to revive Khilafa. In all of the countries where Arab Spring rebellions took place – Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria (ongoing) – secular governments were overthrown in favour of installing an Islamic Theocracy. Conversely, the Arab Spring was equally unsuccessful for Muslims themselves, and ultimately for Islam in the long-term, in that it inevitably led to a backlash of anti-Islam sentiments around the world. Non-Muslims from the Western world, Africa and Asia were appalled at the violence displayed by Al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamist groups who sought to overthrow Gaddafi, and by the FSA (loose coalition including Jabhat Al-Nusra Front and administered by the Muslim Brotherhood) who currently seek to overthrow Assad. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood assumed presidency, following the ousting of secular Mubarak. What’s worse, the narrative of unfolding events became muddy, as these Islamist ‘freedom fighters’ supported by many Muslims around the globe were fighting in alliance with Western governments, receiving funds to bomb ‘Muslim lands’ and kill (Muslim and non-Muslim) civilians, all in the name of re-establishing Khilafa or an Islamist resurgence revolution. The non-Muslims indigenous to these lands, whose ancestral identities predate Islam by centuries at the least, took up arms to resist this war of islamisation and to protect themselves, largely in vain. Many of them who earlier on had legitimate grievances against their (secular) government, now dismally realising that their revolution for progressive governance had been hijacked by the theologically puritanical Salafist lobby. In Egypt, there remains to this day, no end to the sorrow of the Copt Christians.
However doleful these recent series of events sound, they are neither new nor isolated in Islam’s history. Islam, fundamentally is a philosophy of Divide and Rule. As the religion along with its fundamentals expand, so too must its political domain. It would not be incorrect to say that the growth of Islam is determined by the area of land its laws preside over. Islam is the only religion that militarilly, demands dominion over the personal, spiritual, social, cultural, national and political spheres of life. Etymologically and ideologically, Islam means submission. Submission to Allah’s will, and his way of doing things. The original natives of Arabia during the era Islam came to being, were forced to give up all jahiliya customs that were contradictory to, and couldn’t be subjugated by the Islamic way of life. These non-Muslims were Islamised at the pain of death. The Prophet himself, torched various Pagan places of worship in Arabia and at the time of his death, instructed his disciples to ensure that ‘no two religions were left standing in Arabia’. After the Prophet died, the succeeding Caliph Omar saw to the Prophet’s dying wish and continued the Prophet’s wars of Islamisation: a militaristic pogrom against the non-islamic way of life. As Islam spread from Arabia, so did the new (Islamised) Arabic culture, which became taught to Muslim converts as the Islamic way of life. Muslims are taught through the Hadith, that Muhammad is the most perfect human being and that man’s ultimate religious goal in life is to emulate Muhammad in the way that he slept, ate, spoke, prayed, dressed, and governed. Converts who live on lands where the culture is unislamic in nature, must change this jahiliya culture on the lands they live on, to reflect that of Muhammad and the early Muslim community who dwelt in Arabia. Islam does not teach Muslim converts to seek solutions for poverty or escalating unemployment in secularism, but to Islamise their community first and seek Islamic solutions therein. For many Muslims, the Arab Spring was a rebellion to bring about this change in culture, governance and to mould the spiritual direction of the global Ummah. One mustn’t be disingenuous enough to not admit that instability, crisis, Divide & Conquer, forced conversion, imperialism and colonialism (which imperialism is a part of), are enshrined in appropriating the fundamentals of Islam. These iniquitous outcomes are not engineered by a third party, for example the West. Even when Islamists are allied with the West, these iniquitous outcomes, are intrinsic to the spread of Islamic philosophy.
The Islamic forays into the Indian subcontinent was instrumental at imposing islamisation campaigns on the vast, pluralist peoples of India. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan used to be integral constituents of the Indian Subcontinent but they no longer are today, as a result of their Islamic colonisation. Arab invaders plundered the wealth of the land and conducted campaigns to destroy many Polytheist places of worship and learning centres. They enslaved millions of the infidels, sold them in slave markets and frequently effected genocides upon the many who resisted forced conversion to Islam. But for the Hanafi school of thought (which for the first time ever, allowed Islam to extend Dhimmi status beyond People of the Book, to Polytheists), the relatively few years of religious laxity under the likes of ‘enlightened Akbar’, the existence of a sophisticated and advanced civilisation prior to Islam, and the immense size of India; but for these factors, the entire subcontinent – not just Pakistan – would have emerged following more than a thousand years of Muslim rule, as Muslim land. Long before British mercenaries set foot on India, there were unutterable human rights atrocities being perpetuated by Muslim rulers there, against the Polytheist Indians, firstly under the governance of Baghdad and Caliph al-Walid of Damascus, and then later under the watch of the Ottoman Caliph. What’s more, these atrocities which were inaugurated into Islam by the Prophet himself, were not the outcome of not applying the fundamentals of Islam properly, but of dutifully applying the fundamentals of Islam to the letter.
The excerpt below is from chapter 6 of M. A. Khan’s stellar, factual and thoroughly researched book Islamic Jihad: A Legacy of Forced Conversion, Imperialism and Slavery.
©2013. Secular African Society. All Rights Reserved.
HINDU-MUSLIM DIVIDE: A BRITISH INVENTION?
One aspect of the British imperialism in India, which critics of the subcontinent have obsessively used for demonizing the British, was their “Divide and Rule” policy. These critics claim that the British rulers created animosity between Hindus and Muslims as a premeditated stratagem to weaken the unity and neutralize the collective resistance of Indians for facilitating their continued occupation and exploitation. They argue that this clever ploy kept the Hindus and Muslims of India divided; they fought each other over their religious differences, allowing the British rule to continue unimpeded.
An overwhelming majority of the people in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan also think that this British-created religious divide is the root cause of the internecine communal troubles that have continued to plague India to this day. They entertain a deeply-entrenched belief that religious animosity between Hindus and Muslims was totally unknown in India before the British rulers came and devised this cunning and malevolent scheme to keep the Hindus and Muslims at each other’s throat.
This hyperbolic criticism of the British “Divide and Rule” policy has been consumed voraciously and regurgitated frequently by all and sundry: Hindus and Muslims, progressives and obscurantists, liberals and zealots. There existed, believe critics, a wonderful relationship of amity, tolerance, brotherhood and co- operation between the Hindus and Muslims before the devious and manipulative British spoiled it all. Even Nehru painted a picture that the British deliberately created a division between the Hindus and Muslims. India’s Congress Party viewed this conspiracy theory as a major underlying cause of the continued Hindu- Muslim conflicts in post-independence India; and all blame was conveniently heaped, in absentia, on the former colonists.
The British rulers undoubtedly exploited the religious division amongst Indians to their advantage. But the question that must be asked is: Was there a unity and brotherhood between Hindus and Muslims during the centuries of Muslim rule in pre-British India?
The claim that a utopian harmony existed in pre-British India is not at all supported by available historical evidence; it, instead, point to the contrary. During the centuries of Muslim rule in India, every major Hindu temple was destroyed and many of them were replaced by mosques, often with towering minarets, as a twin symbol of Islam’s triumph as well as the subjugation and humiliation of the Hindus. Even after the British mercenaries first landed in India as traders in early 1600s, Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707) was destroying thousands of temples and forcing the Hindus all over India to convert to Islam. Islamic persecution and brutality virtually extinguished the light of Buddhism in India, a vibrant religion in parts of India when the Muslim invaders came. The Sikhs and Jains also suffered their share of terrible atrocity during the Muslim rule.
Could such blatant persecution of India’s natives—the Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs—by Muslim invaders and rulers possibly foster a brotherly and harmonious relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims?
If the answer is “yes”, then the much smaller hostility shown by the Hindus against Muslims in recent years, such as in their largely justifiable campaign to restore the destroyed Ram temple at the site of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, must also be fostering tolerance, amity and unity between them. Undeniably, there could not but exist a huge divide between Muslims and the non-Muslims in pre-British India resulting from the extreme persecution of non-Muslims by Muslim rulers.
The myth that a serene harmony and peace existed between Muslims and non-Muslims in pre-British India—propagated by Secular-Marxist and Muslim historians—is nothing but an absurd falsification of history. It contradicts all existing historical evidence, comprising loads of documents left by contemporary Muslim chroniclers and rulers. This alleged harmony and peace is also contradicts the core principles of Islam, which view the idolatrous natives of India as the inveterate enemy and demands their outright extermination.
British exploitation of Hindu-Muslim divide: Obviously, there existed a huge chasm between Muslims and non-Muslims of India. The British mercenaries, after arriving in India, witnessed it themselves for a long time before they started capturing power in 1757. In front of their own eyes, Emperor Aurangzeb destroyed thousands of Hindu temples; they witnessed his bloody, bitter, ceaseless struggles with Marathas, Sikhs and others. The British later exploited this pre-existing discord and animosity to their advantage. For example, in the wake of the Sepoy Mutiny, the Chief Commissioner Sir Henry Lawrence addressed an assembly of Hindu and Muslim sepoys in Lucknow that, 524
Soldiers! Some persons are abroad spreading reports that the Government desires to interfere with the religion of their soldiers; you all know this to be a transparent falsehood. …Alamgeer (Aurangzeb) in former times, and Hyder Ali in later days, forcibly converted thousands of Hindoos, desecrated their fanes [religious places], demolished their temples, and carried ruthless devastation amongst their household gods. Come to our times. Many here present will know that Runjeet Singh never permitted his Mohammedan subjects to call the pious to prayer—never allowed the muezzin to sound from the lofty minarets which adorn Lahore, and remain to this day a monument of their magnificent founders. The year before last a Hindoo could not have dared to build a temple in Lucknow. All this is changed. Now, who is there who would dare to interfere with our Mohammedan or Hindoo subjects…?
This example not only points to a British exploitation of the division between Muslims and non-Muslims, but also affirms the historical truth that this divide had existed since long before the British capture of power. Whether because of this divisive British ploy or not, it is a fact that the Hindus and other non-Muslims of India did not support the Sepoy Mutiny as enthusiastically as did Muslims. The Sikhs and Ghurkhas supported the British. The Sikhs obviously did not forget the extreme brutality they had suffered under Aurangzeb [see ‘The Islamic Conquest and Rule of India]. They helped the British to recapture Delhi. The Scindia in the North and many other states were on the British side, too.
Why should the Sikhs and Hindus participate in the mutiny anyway? Although the British held the executive power, Muhammad Shah Jaffar was still the official head of India at the time. Shah Jaffar is much eulogized by today’s Indians—both Muslim and non-Muslim—as a great revolutionary patriot for instigating the Sepoy Mutiny. But he was essentially fighting to drive the British mercenaries out of India for reestablishing the lost Muslim sovereignty of the yesteryear, not for restoring political power to the people of India. Upon Shah Jaffar’s appeal, Muslims across India considered the Sepoy Mutiny to be a Jihad against the British for reinstating the lost Islamic domination. In the course of the Sepoy Mutiny, Shah Jaffar declared himself the Emperor of India and issued coins in his name, the standard way of asserting Islamic imperial status. His name was added to the khutbah (sermon) in Muslim prayers, which symbolized the acceptance by Muslims that he was the Amir (leader) of India.
The Ottoman stand on the Sepoy Mutiny did not help Muslim’s Jihad against the British Raj either. Following the ouster of Muslim rulers by the British, India’s Muslims—generally hateful of living under non- Muslim rule—pledged their allegiance to the powerful Ottoman sultan, accepting him as their caliph. But the British assistance to the Ottomans in the Crimean war against Russia helped the Raj obtain an Ottoman order ‘advising the Indian Muslim not to fight against them (the British),’ which was read out in mosque sermons around India. The Ottoman sultan, instead of showing support, ‘condemned and abhorred the atrocities committed by the Mutineers…’525 Obviously under the Ottoman influence, the prominent Muslim scholars and ulema of India met in Calcutta in 1857 and issued a fatwa, in view of the British government’s cordial relationship with the Ottoman sultan, the caliph of Islam, that ‘‘jehad against the British nation is unlawful.’’526 According to Salar Jang, the Muslim prime minister of Hyderabad, ‘‘the whole influence of the (Ottoman) Caliphate was used most unremittingly from Constantinople to check the spread of Mutiny’’ and to rally the Indian Muslims around the British Raj in order to pay the debt, he owed, to Great Britain for the British support in the Crimean war.527 Because of this discouraging position of the Ottoman sultan, the de facto political and spiritual head of Indian Muslims, their enthusiasm for the anti-British Jihad lost steam. ‘‘At the bidding of their caliph,’’ adds Salar Jang, ‘‘the most warlike of the native races (Indian Muslims)… gave their unstinted support to the British connection at the supreme moment (of the revolt).’’
Following the suppression of the Mutiny, the British Raj understood that their prospect of long-term rule in India lies in exploiting the long-existing bitter religious discord between Muslim and non-Muslim Indians. Thereafter, they applied a divisive ploy, particularly in the army, by putting the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh soldiers in separate quarters—never to serve in the same unit again.528
In their Jihad to oust the British rulers, the defunct Mughal leaders (Nawabs) tried to win the support of Hindus by offering them various incentives. For example, they agreed to hand-over the hotly contentious Ram temple/Babri Mosque site in Ayodhya to Hindus in order to assuage their anti-Muslim discontent, thereby coaxing them to join the Mutiny. Many Hindu soldiers in the British force jointly revolted with their Muslim colleagues. Hindus in the United Provinces, Delhi, parts of Central India and Bihar joined the revolt in large numbers. But, on the whole, the participation of Hindus and other non-Muslims in the mutiny was less enthusiastic; elsewhere, they sided with the British.
The Sepoy Mutiny, in all likelihood, meant for reestablishing the days of jizyah and slavery for non- Muslims, which the British had abolished. The Sepoy Mutiny, according to Nehru, was an effort to reestablish the old feudalism, which he abhorred. ‘The Revolt of 1857–58 was the last flicker of feudal India,’ he asserts.529 Would it have been wise for India’s non-Muslims to throw their lot in with the Muslims, drive out the British and return to the Mughal rule once again? The British exploitation was possibly as bad as the Muslim one. Otherwise, they were definitely freer, less molested, more respectable, and even somewhat privileged under the British Raj than what they had enjoyed under the previous Muslim rule. ‘The British period—two hundred years in some places, less than a hundred years in others—was a time of Hindu regeneration,’ notes Naipaul.530 For them, returning to dhimmitude under the Islamic yoke once again was clearly a less attractive choice.
HINDU-MUSLIM DISCORD, PARTITION OF INDIA & BRITISH COMPLICITY
The British rulers have also been roundly blamed, particularly by Hindus, for the Partition of India in 1947. As the movement for India’s independence started building up following the founding of the Indian National Congress Party in 1885, a Hindu-Muslim tension also started building up over the political control of independent India. The founding of the All India Muslim League Party later in 1906 further boosted the tension. It took a violent turn in the 1920s and more dangerously, in the 1940s—leading to the eventual Partition of the subcontinent in 1947 into two states: India and Pakistan. The Partition-related riots caused as many as two million deaths. The British Raj has been summarily condemned for this devastating violence. However, the British complicity in the Partition and the violence connected to it demands a thorough examination.
A fomenting nationalist movement was sweeping across India in the early twentieth century. It gained manifold momentum after Mahatma Gandhi arrived from South Africa in 1914. His nonviolence movement, clothed in Hindu religious principles (ahimsa etc.), greatly aroused the Indian masses. The overwhelming response to Gandhi’s call for the boycott of the 1919 Constitution on 20 September 1920 and for civil disobedience in December 1921 made it clear that the days of the British imperialism in India had been numbered.
During this time, there arose two separate movements amongst India’s Muslims. The pious started the “Khilafat (Caliphate) Movement” (1919–23). Earlier, as British mercenaries started ousting Muslim rulers one after another, Muslims of India increasingly looked to the Ottoman sultan as their political head and savior. This trend was inspired by the teachings of the widely popular Sufi master Shah Walliullah (d. 1762), who, seeing that Muslim power in India was crumbling, recognized the Ottoman sultan as Amir al-Muminin, the leader of the believers. After the ouster of Tipu Sultan in 1799, Muslim allegiance overwhelmingly lied with the Ottomans, which can be gathered from their pliant response to the Ottoman opposition to Sepoy Mutiny.
The Anglo-French forces occupied much of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War and partitioned it into small independent states. This infuriated Muslims worldwide. The indignant pious Muslims in India, in their rage against the British interference in Ottoman affairs, waged a campaign for ousting the British from India. They were in favor of establishing a pan-Islamic caliphate spanning all Muslim lands of the world headed by the Ottoman caliph. They wanted India to be a part of it after the eviction of the British. The Congress Party led by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru—desperate to oust the common enemy, the British—joined this Islamist movement. It lost favor among the Congress Party leaders following the barbaric Muslim violence against innocent Hindus in Malabar (Kerala, 1921), known as the “Mopla Rebellion” (see below). It was abandoned altogether when Kemal Ataturk dismantled the Ottoman caliphate in 1923.
The nationalist minded Muslims started a second campaign for creating a separate Muslim state. The idea was floated with the founding of the Muslim League Party in 1906, but gained momentum after the death of the Khilafat Movement. This separatist movement was initiated, because Muslims feared that they might have to live in an independent democratic India politically dominated by the majority Hindus. This fear was clearly reflected in Allama Muhammad Iqbal’s criticism of democracy as a system of governance, in which, “heads are counted, not weighed“. Muhammad Iqbal (his family had converted to Islam from Hinduism not long ago), pathologically blinded by the supremacist Islamic ideology, thought that ‘All land belongs to the Muslims, because it belongs to their God.’531 Therefore, although all the great thinkers and Nobel laureates of India were Hindu, the Muslim heads weighed higher than the Hindu ones to bigoted Iqbal. It may be noted here that, in the course of unleashing mindless violence for seceding Pakistan in 1947, the Muslim League Party, led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, circulated secret pamphlets amongst Muslims, saying: ‘‘One Muslim should get the right of five Hindus, i.e., each Muslim is equal to five Hindus.’’532 Having realized the impossibility of gaining the old Muslim political ascendancy in united India, Iqbal presented a firm and clear blueprint of Pakistan as a separate homeland for Muslims in his Presidential Address in the All-India Muslim League Meet in Allahabad on 29 December 1930.533 In pointing to the incompatibility of Islam with a secular- democratic polity, Iqbal noted:
‘Is religion a private affair? Would you like to see Islam as a moral and political ideal, meeting the same fate in the world of Islam as Christianity has already met in Europe? Is it possible to retain Islam as an ethical ideal and to reject it as a polity, in favor of national polities in which (the) religious attitude is not permitted to play any part? This question becomes of special importance in India, where the Muslims happen to be a minority. The proposition that religion is a private individual experience is not surprising on the lips of a European. In Europe the conception of Christianity as a monastic order, renouncing the world of matter and fixing its gaze entirely on the world of spirit, led, by a logical process of thought, to the view embodied in this proposition. The nature of the Prophet’s religious experience, as disclosed in the Quran, however, is wholly different.’
Therefore, Muslims needed a state, in which the religious scruples will be thoroughly integrated into the polity, as added Iqbal:
‘The religious ideal of Islam, therefore, is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. This is a matter which at the present moment directly concerns the Muslims of India.’
Muslims, therefore, needed a separate state, as Iqbal goes on to articulate the “Two Nation” theory:
‘I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated Northwest Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of Northwest India.’
In a 1937 letter to Jinnah, Iqbal candidly agrees that his proposed separate Muslim state was meant for saving ‘Muslims from the domination of Non-Muslims’ and also proposed to include the Muslim-dominated far-off Bengal in such a state, saying: ‘Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are.’534 Just before his death in 1938, Iqbal urged Muslims to rally around Jinnah, saying,
‘There is only one way out. Muslims should strengthen Jinnah’s hands. They should join the Muslim League. Indian question, as is now being solved, can be countered by our united front against both the Hindus and the English. Without it our demands are not going to be accepted. People say our demands smack of communalism. This is sheer propaganda. These demands relate to the defence of our national existence.’535
The campaign for creating Pakistan gathered momentum under Jinnah’s stewardship. Muslim League passed the “Lahore Resolution” in 1940 demanding the creation of a separate independent Muslim state, Pakistan. The resolution said, ‘…the areas in which Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, are grouped to constitute “independent states” in which the constituent units will be autonomous and sovereign.’536
Having exercised their brutally mighty lordship over the non-Muslims for so long, Muslims’ historical pride could not bear to let them become a minority but equal citizens in an independent secular- democratic India. They unleashed mindless violence in their secessionist campaign for founding a Muslim homeland (see below), which convinced the British that the Hindus and Muslims could not live together. These circumstances led to the eventual division of subcontinental India in 1947. Islam, fundamentally, thinks Anwar Skaikh, is an ideology of “Divide and Rule”. He thinks this Islamic Divide and Rule, not the divisive British policy, was responsible for the Partition of India:537
…but the wound inflicted by their (Islamic invaders’) ideology i.e. Islam, which brought them to India, cannot be effaced from memory because instead of healing, this hurt has turned into an incurable abscess. Though 95 percent of all Muslims descend from the original population and the remaining 5 percent also qualify as Indians owing to their permanent residence over the centuries, they all want to be considered as a separate Muslim nation, dedicated to the belief that their motherland is a Dar-ul- Harb. It is this iniquitous philosophy, which caused the partition of India. What the Arabs (Arab invaders) failed to do themselves, the Arabian doctrine of Divide and Rule has done for them.
As Muslim zealotry for creating a separate Islamic state gathered strength, there arose a nationalistic Hindu movement, which opposed the division of their motherland. This neo-Hindutva movement is often viewed as an equally culpable partner in the Partition-related riots and bloodbath. But, indisputably, Muslims’ unwillingness to accept a united and democratic India with a non-Muslim majority population was the primary reason for the violence and massacres that took place during the Partition.
The Hindutva nationalists have also received severe condemnation for the continued communal tension and violence in independent India. In the first place, the birth of Hindutva movement was a natural reaction to Muslims’ unreasonable, bigoted campaign to include India into a pan-Islamic Caliphate as intended by the Khilafat Movement (aided by Gandhi and Nehru et al.), to their separatist demand for creating an independent state dividing India, and to their indulgence in mindless violence against the Hindus (e.g., Mopla Rebellion) to achieve their goal.
Muslims came to India as brutal invaders and ruled for centuries. They inflicted utmost cruelty, including mass slaughter and enslavement of native Indians, engaged in massive plundering and looting of their wealth and perpetrated large-scale destruction of their religious symbols and institutions. The economic exploitations aside, the British rule came somewhat as a relief to India’s non-Muslims after their sufferance of enduring Islamic brutality and humiliation. As the British rulers were about to leave, returning India’s sovereignty to the people after so many centuries of foreign rule, Muslims became hell-bent on dividing the land. Although a great multitude of Indians had become Muslim during Islamic conquests and rule resulting from forced conversion, enslavement and other forms of persecution and economic compulsions, they had no right to divide India based on a foreign ideology so brutally imposed on the people. Muslims’ demand for an independent homeland and unleashing of mindless violence to achieve it, therefore, created the perfect ground for the rise of nationalist sentiments and religious zealotry amongst Hindus. Consequently, for the first time, some Hindus as a religious entity rose up as a militant religio-nationalistic force to confront the instigatory Muslims from dividing their country. Particularly after the Mopla violence (1921), Hindu cultural, religious, political and nationalistic ideas were floated. In 1925, a Hindutva organization, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), was founded on Hindu and Hindustani nationalism. It was a natural reaction to the long period of historical injustice and to the ongoing Muslim bigotry, intolerance and violence.
For the complete references to the above excerpt, please refer to M. A. Khan’s book:Islamic Jihad: A Legacy of Imperialism, Forced Conversion and Slavery. A free copy is available online.
522. Curtin PD (1993) The Tropical Atlantic of the Slave Trade, In M Adas ed., Islam & European Expansion, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, p. 172.
523. Lal (1973), p. 25–32
524. Brown RC (1870) The Punjab and Delhi in 1857, Atlantic, Delhi, p. 33 165
525. Ozcan A (1977) Pan Islamism, Indian Muslims, the Ottomans & Britain (1877-1924), Brill, Leiden, p. 16
526. Ibid, p. 20
527. Ibid, p. 17
528. Braudel F (1995) A History of Civilizations, Translated by Mayne R, Penguin Books, New York, p. 242
529. Nehru (1989), p. 415
530. Naipaul (1998), p. 247
531. Elst, p. 41
532. Khosla GD (1989) Stern Reckoning: A Survey of Events Leading Up To and Following the Partition of India, Oxford University Press, Delhi, p. 313
533. Sherwani LA ed. (1977) Speeches, Writings, and Statements of Iqbal, Iqbal Academy (2nd Edition), Lahore, p. 3–26.
534. Allama Iqbal Biography; http://www.allamaiqbal.com/person/biography/biotxtread.html
535. Iqbal and Pakistan Movement; http://www.allamaiqbal.com/person/movement/move_main.htm
536. Menon VP (1957) The Transfer of Power, Orient Longman, New Delhi, p. 83
537. Shaikh (1998), Chapter 7.
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